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GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AS DEFENDANTS:
TWO TROUBLESOME PROBLEMS
Kenneth Culp Davis t
A plaintiff who wants to compel or to enjoin governmental action
usually escapes the doctrine of sovereign immunity by suing an officer.
The courts are accustomed to indulging in the fiction that such a suit
is not against the government, even though all concerned are fully
aware that it is. The question whether or when sovereign immunity
is a defense in such a suit against an officer has been treated elsewhere.1
This paper is concerned with the two incidental but troublesome problems of superior officers as indispensable parties in suits against subordinate officers, and the substitution of successors of officers who are
named as defendants.
On the first of these two problems, only slight exaggeration is
involved in the statement that eight Supreme Court decisions provide
eight solutions. On the second problem, the Advisory Committee on
Rules for Civil Procedure has asserted that "the substitution of one
nominal party for another nominal party is a time-consuming formality," but proposes to continue the requirement of the formality.' Both
problems happily seem to be susceptible to satisfactory solution.
SUPERIOR OFFICERS AS INDISPENSABLE PARTIES

The law that superior officers are sometimes indispensable parties
in suits to enjoin or to compel action by subordinate officers is not only
wholly judge-made, but it has been remade frequently by the Supreme
Court. Despite the obvious need for clarity and simplicity on this
subordinate but often decisive question of procedural law, the result
has been over a period of several decades an almost complete unpredictability of decisions either of the Supreme Court or of lower federal courts.
Unless a statute permits a suit against an agency or against the
United States, a suit in a federal court challenging administrative
t Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. A.B., 1931, Whitman
College; LL.B., 1934, Harvard Law School.
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action must be brought against an officer. A suit against a field officer,
who can be locally served, is usually more convenient to a plaintiff
than a suit against the agency head, who normally can be served and
sued only in the District of Columbia. The question whether an agency
head or superior officer is an indispensable party therefore arises frequently.3 The one proposition that is clear in the case law is that sometimes a superior is an indispensable party and sometimes not.
Before the 1955 decision in Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro. which takes
a wholly new approach, the key case was the 1947 decision in Williams
v. Fanning.5 The action was brought against the postmaster at Los
Angeles to enjoin enforcement of a fraud order. In holding that the
Postmaster General, in whose name the fraud order had been issued,
was not an indispensable party, the Court laid down what is supposed
to be the guiding principle: ".

. . [T]he superior officer is an indis-

pensable party if the decree granting the relief sought will require him
to take action, either by exercising directly a power lodged in him or
by having a subordinate exercise it for him." 0
The Court strangely-perhaps facetiously-acknowledged that the
principle it enunciated was ". . . not as clear to others as it seems
to us." 7 The Court evidently did not see the difficulties that others

see in applying the principle. Those difficulties involve the distinction
between action and inaction, and the distinction between action of a
subordinate and action of a superior through a subordinate. To apply
the principle to the Williams case, one has to inquire whether an injunction against enforcement of a fraud order requires the Postmaster
General, who issued the fraud order,

"

.

to take action, either by

exercising directly a power lodged in him or by having a subordinate
exercise it for him." The first step is to discover whether the injunction against enforcement of the fraud order requires anyone "to take
action." To stop enforcing the fraud order is in one sense wholly
negative. But the mechanics, presumably, will involve an act of the
Los Angeles postmaster to direct his subordinates to deliver mail to
the particular addressee instead of returning it to senders. To say
that that is "an act," as distinguished from mere inaction, seems en3. The problem of whether a subordinate is an indispensable party in a suit
against a superior seldom arises. In Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442, 455 (1934),

the Court said: "The purpose of the suit was to control the action of the Chief of
Finance, that is, to compel him to pay or cause to be paid the voucher in question.
The disbursing officer as the mere agent of his superior officer is not an indispensable,
although he might have been joined as a proper, party."
4. 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
5. 332 U.S. 490 (1947).
6. Id. at 493.
7. Id. at 494.
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tirely reasonable. If it is an act, whose act is it? Is it the act of the
Los Angeles postmaster, or is the Postmaster General taking the action
(" . either by exercising directly a power lodged in him or by
having a subordinate exercise it for him"? This question seems
impossible to answer. But the Court answered it: "It is [the local
postmaster] who .

.

. places the stamp 'fraudulent' on the mail, who

returns the mail to the senders. If he desists in those acts, the matter
is at an end. That is all the relief which petitioners seek. The decree
in order to be effective need not require the Postmaster General to
do a single thing-either directly as in the Smith and Fall cases or
indirectly through his subordinate as in the Rutter case." 8
The Postmaster General, then, is not acting "indirectly through
his subordinate as in the Rutter case" when the Los Angeles postmaster
lifts the fraud order by directing that the mail be delivered to the addressee. We turn to Gnerich v. Rutter 9 to find out when a superior
does act "indirectly through his subordinate." The suit was to enjoin
local prohibition officers from enforcing a restriction on a pharmacist's
permit to sell intoxicants. The Supreme Court unequivocally declared
that the local officers ". . . are mere agents and subordinates of the
Commissioner. . . . What they do is as if done by him. He is the

public's real representative in the matter, and, if the injunction were
granted, his are the hands which would be tied. All this being so, he
should have been made a party defendant. .

.

."

1

The crucial question the Court did not answer in the Williams
opinion is why the Court in the Williams case did not use the reasoning
the Court used in the Rutter case. On the authority of Rutter the
Court could have reasoned in Williams, as in Rutter, that the local
postmaster and his assistants "are mere agents and subordinates" of
the Postmaster General. "What they do is as if done by him. He is
the public's real representative in the matter, and, if the injunction
were granted, his are the hands which would be tied."
What emerges, then, is a principle that the superior officer is an
indispensable party if the decree granting the relief sought will require
him to take action either personally or through a subordinate. When
local officers put a restriction on a license, an injunction against enforcement of the restriction ties the hands of the superior officer, who
8. Ibid. The Court assumes that the fraud order issued by the Postmaster
General remains outstanding after the court enjoins its enforcement. Of course,
some one on behalf of the Postmaster General is likely to take action to withdraw it.
The Court is speaking quite unrealistically when it says that the local postmaster
. places the stamp 'fraudulent' on the mail. . . ." Like the Postmaster
General, the Los Angeles postmaster necessarily acts principally through assistants.
9. 265 U.S. 388 (1924).
10. Id. at 391.
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is therefore an indispensable party. When the Postmaster General
issues a fraud order, an injunction against enforcement of the order
does not tie the hands of the Postmaster General, who is therefore
not an indispensable party. And the Court went out of its way to
pretend that the Williams result was consistent with the Rutter result.
This is the principal fountainhead from which the confusion has
flowed on the question whether a superior officer is an indispensable
party in an action to challenge action of a local officer.
Additional confusion has been caused by the Court's pretense in
the Williams opinion that three other prior decisions, as well as the
Rutter case, were reconcilable with each other and with "the principle"
laid down in the Williams opinion. In Warner Valley Stock Co. v.
Smith," the plaintiff sought not only an injunction against both the
Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Secretary of the
Interior but also an order directing the Secretary to issue land patents.
After the Secretary resigned, the Court held that the Secretary was
indispensable because "the purpose of the bill was to control the action
of the Secretary..

,,

12

But since the purpose of the suit in the

Williams case was to challenge a fraud order issued by the Postmaster
General, was not the purpose of the bill to control the action of the
Postmaster General?
Webster v. Fall'" was a suit to require local disbursing officers
to make a payment of money. The Court held the Secretary of the
Interior indispensable because "the statutory direction to cause quarterly payments to be made .

.

. is addressed to the Secretary.

The

power and responsibility are his." '" Of course, the statutory direction
to issue fraud orders is addressed to the Postmaster General. The
power and responsibility are his. But the Court purports to extract
"the principle" of the Williams case from the four cases of which
the Webster case is one.
In Colorado v. Toll,' a superior officer who issued a regulation
forbidding operation of automobiles for hire in a national park was
not an indispensable party in a suit to enjoin enforcement of the regulation; the only reason given was that the suit was ".

.

. to restrain

an individual from doing acts that it is alleged that he has no authority
to do. .

,"

16

The Court apparently had forgotten the idea of

the Rutter case that the injunction would tie the hands of the superior,
11. 165 U.S. 28 (1897).
12. Id. at 34.
13. 266 U.S. 507 (1925).

14. Id. at 510.
15. 268 U.S. 228 (1925).

16. Id. at 230.
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and. it had apparently forgotten the idea of the Webster case that "the
-power and responsibility.' are the superior's, .The Toll case supports
the Williams holding, .but it does not support the pretense, of the
Williams opinion that. the line of decisions was straight.
In the first two decisions since the Williams case, the Supreme
Cotirt has done nothing to dispel the confusion, and the second of them
is difficult to reconcile with Williams. The first of,the two, Hynes v.
Grimes Packing Co.,7 applies the Williams principle without difficulty.
The suit was to enjoin a regional director in Alaska from .enforcing
regulations issued by the Secretary of the Interior prohibiting certain
fishing in Alaskan waters. Applying the Williams test, the Court
held that the Secretary was not an indispensable party: "Nothing is
required of the Secretary; he does not have to perform any act, either
directly or indirectly. Respondents merely seek an injunction restraining petitioner from interfering with their fishing. No affirmative action
is required of petitioner, and if he and his, subordinates cease their
interference, respondents have been accorded all the relief. which they
seek." 18

The Grimes case seems quite satisfactory in its emphasis upon
the idea that the Court may order the subordinate to ignore both the
superior's instructions and the formal regulations .issued by the superior. Judge Learned Hand once indulged in the pjausible reasoning
that a superior officer must be made a party to avoid leaving the
subordinate under a command of his superior to do what the court
forbids.19 This reasoning is authoritatively rejected by the Grimes
case; it had already been discredited by the remark in the Williams
opinion that the superior's command to do what the court forbids is
immaterial if the decree which is entered will effectively grant
,
the relief desired by expending itself on the subordinate ...
The 1952 decision in Blackmar v. Guerre2 may be inconsistent
with both Williams and Grimes.. A federal employee sought a declaratory judgment that he had been illegally discharged. A regional office of
the Civil Service Commission had held in his favor but had been
reversed by the Commission in Washington. Since service had been
made upon the discharging officer, Guerre, the Court could have held,
in accordance with "the principle" enunciated in the Williams opinion
and followed in the Grimes opinion, that a declaratory judgment that
"

7.
.18.
19.
20.
21.

337 U.S. 86 (1949).
Id. at 97.
National Conference v. Goldman, 85 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1936).
332 U.S. at 494.
342 U.S. 512 (1952),
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Guerre was legally obligated to reinstate the plaintiff did not require
affirmative action either by the Civil Service Commission or by its
members. Instead, the Supreme Court disposed of the whole issue
of indispensable parties by saying of Guerre, without amplification, that
.

.

it is obvious that norelief can be granted against him."

22

But why is it obvious that the man who discharged the plaintiff
may not be the defendant in a suit for a declaration that the discharge
was illegal? Why is it not obvious, instead, that the man who commits the challenged act is the proper party defendant, especially since
the Williams and Grimes cases establish the proposition that a court
may order a subordinate to violate the orders of his superior?
Perhaps the Court assumed in the Blackmar opinion that review
of the Civil Service Commission's decision is improper unless either
the Commission or the commissioners are parties. But this assumption
is contrary to a good deal of tradition. After the Postmaster General
(or some other high official acting for him) makes a decision to issue
a fraud order, a court may enjoin enforcement of the order in a suit
against a local postmaster.' The familiar practice of more than half
a century in alien cases allows a writ of habeas corpus against the
local officer to challenge a decision which has been made by the immigration inspector, affirmed by the board of appeals, and again affirmed
by the Attorney General.24
Before the Supreme Court's 1955 decision in the Pedreiro case,
the lower courts had as guides the unintelligible "principle" of the
Williams case and seven conflicting Supreme Court decisions. Almost
any routine case can be used to illustrate the confusion and unpredictability. For instance, a landlord sued a local officer for a declara...tory. judgment that an increase in rent was less -than-the-statute requited. Was the Housing Expediter an indispensable party.? Could
the court grant the relief sought without requiring the Expediter to
take action either personally or through a subordinate? Under the
Williams "principle," if the subordinate should grant the further increase sought, would his act be that of the Expediter acting through
him? Under the Williams case, could a decree granting relief expend
itself on the subordinate? Under the Webster case, is the Expediter
22. Id. at 515.
23. This is not only the holding in Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490 (1947),
but the Court there said: "Beginning at least with American School of Magnetic
Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, decided in 1902, the maintenance of the suit
against the local postmaster alone was not challenged." Id. at 492. (Footnote
omitted).
24. The practice rests upon a habeas corpus statute, which is now 62 STAT.
965 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1952): "The writ, or order to show cause shall be
directed to the person having custody of the person detained."
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indispensable because "the power and responsibility are his"? Under
Gnerich v. Rutter, must the Expediter be joined because "his are the
hands which would be tied"? Or does a declaratory judgment tie anybody's hands? Should the Grimes case be invoked for the proposition
that "nothing is required of the Secretary [the Expediter]; he does
not have to perform any act, either directly or indirectly"?
Which of the various guides should the lower court follow? The
court of appeals, citing five unreported decisions to the same effect,
held that the Expediter was an indispensable party.25
Trying to predict holdings of lower courts has been an intriguing
but unprofitable pastime. An informed lawyer might have guessed
that in a suit for an injunction and a declaratory judgment against
local Army and Coast Guard officers, the court would hold that national
officers were not indispensable because the relief sought was entirely
negative in the sense that no act was required.&2 6 But the informed
lawyer's predicting average would be reduced to thirty-three per cent
if he applied the same approach to a pair of rent cases. A plaintiff who
sought a declaratory judgment that his housing was not subject to
regulation lost his case in the court of appeals for failure to join the
Expediter, because "this is not the type of case where 'the decree, if
granted, would expend itself on the subordinate.' "27 The court did
not explain this remark; the informed lawyer might think it would be
easier to explain an opposite statement. A plaintiff who sued the
area director to enjoin regulation of rents and for a declaratory, judgment that his apartment house was not subject to rent control was
denied relief partly for failure to join the Expediter. Surprisingly, the
court reasoned that under the Williams case the Expediter was. not
indispensable foran .injunction but-went on to hold that the injunction
" . .was only incidental to the main relief sought, which was a
decree adjudicating that the leased premises were not subject to rent
control. .

. A decree could not effectively grant such principal re-

lief unless it bound the Housing Expediter, and such a decree, if binding on the Housing Expediter, would interfere with the public administration of rent control. An action for such principal relief could not
be maintained without joining the Housing Expediter as a party." 28
The court did not explain why it thought a declaratory judgment has
a greater binding effect upon the superior than an injunction.
25. Jacobs v. Office of Housing Expediter, 176 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1949).
26. Parker v. Lester, 98 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
27. Cha-Toine Hotel Apartments Bldg. Corp. v. Shogren, 204 F.2d 256, 258
(7th Cir. 1953).
28. May v. Maurer, 185 F.2d 475, 478 (10th Cir. 1950).
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An informed lawyer might have guessed that if a declaratory judgmenpt binds a superior officer in a rent case, a declaratory. judgrpent
ought to-bind a superior.officer in a customs case, but the guess would
be -wrong. In a suit for an injunction and a declaratory judgment
against a collector of customs, the court held that the Commissioner
of Customs was not an indispensable.party because '!. . . if the court
shall conclude -that exclusion of the watches was unlawful, all it need
any exception
dQ is. to forbid the acting collector from making .
in the rights of entry secured to the plaintiff by the customs laws and
regulations." 29

,Post Office employees who- sought permanent status and, an injunction against discharge were told that ".

.

. the Postmaster Gen-

eral and the Civil Service Commission are -necessary and indispensable
parties because their concurrence is necessary to make lawful the relief
sought. .

.

.

)0

If the plaintiffs' lawyer had asked only for an

injunction against discharge-which was in substance nearly all that
the plaintiffs wanted-the court could then have invoked the 'Williams
and the Grimes cases for the conclusion that the decree could expend
itself on the subordinates.3 '
The idea that a court cannot compel subordinates to exercise
authority which their superiors have not delegated to them is an attractive one-until one sees the impracticability of it. If this idea had
governed the Williams case, the Court could not have enjoined the
local postmaster, for the Postmaster General clearly had not delegated
authority to the local postmaster to lift a fraud order issued by the
.Postmaster General. Similarly, the Secretary of the Interior had not
'authorized the Alaskan officials in-the Grimes case to permit violations
of the regulation issued by the Secretary. If a local officer discharges
the plaintiff, may the plaintiff's remedy against the local officer be
defeated by withholding from the local officer the authority to reinstate?
The answer based on narrow logic is yes; the answer based on common 'sense and practicality is no. A court of appeals in Money v.
Wallin " said yes on the basis of narrow logic.
In many suits for injunctions or declaratory judgments against
enforcement by local officers of deportation orders, the lower federal
,courts have had to guess whether national officers must be joined-or
invent their own law on the subject. The cases, of course, have gone
29. Croton Watch Co. v. Laughlin, 208 F.2d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1953).
30. McGrimley v. Foley, 89 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D. Mass. 1950).
31. This is the way plaintiffs' lawyers won on the indispensable-superior issue
in Reeber v. Rossell, 91 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), and in Farrell v. Moomau,
85 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
32. 186 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1951).
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both ways. Most of the courts guessed wrong bout what the'Su-'
preme Court -would finally hold."
In the celebrated case of government seizure of the steel planfg
in 1952, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Cb. v. Sawyer,3 4 an executiVorder directed the Secretary of Commerce to take possession cif tho
plants. The Secretary took possession and designated the president
of each company as operating manager for the United States, subject
to the Secretary's supervision. Thereupon the steel companies gought
declaratory and injunctive relief in an action against the Secretary'
The district court specifically held that the President was "not an in"
dispensable party.

.

.

."

Yet the power and the responsibility

were the President's under the Webster test, and the hands that would
be tied by an injunction were the President's uncter the Rutter test.
But with steel for Korea' awaiting the' decision, and with the whole
country watching, would not the Supreme Court have been embarrassed to apply its judge-made technicalities about indispensable
superiors?
The Supreme Court's pre-1955 case law, including especially the
"principle" laid down in the Williams case, has proved utterly uiriworkable in practice. The Supreme Court failed to provide iritelligible guides to the lower courts and to litigants. Furthermore, "thd
crucial distinctions between action and inaction and between acts 'of a
subordinate and acts of a superior through a subordinate seldom have
any relation to the merits of the question whether the superior officer
should be joined.
The realities of the problem do not lie in such conceptual distinctions but lie elsewhere: (1) The central question is one of venue, which
in turn has to do with geography and traveling expenses. (2) Gov33. In Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955), discussed at pp. 78-79
infra, the Court held that the superior 'need not be joined. Lower courts had held
that the superior must be joined, Rodriguez v. Landon, 212 F.2d 508 (9th Cir.
1954); Paolo v. Garfinkel, 200 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.' 1952); Slavik v. Miller, 184 F.2d
575 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 955 (1951); Podovinnikoff v. Miller,,A79
F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1950); Gong Poy v. Sahli, 125 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ill. 1954);
Corona v. Landon, 111 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Birms v. Commissioner;
103 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1952); Medalha v. Shaughnessy, 102 F. Supp. 950
(S.D.N.Y. 1951). Lower courts had held that the superior need not be joined in
Pedreiro v. Shaughnessy, 213 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1954), aft'd, 349 U.S. 48 (1955);
Dragna v. Landon, 209 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Ragni v. Butterfield, 115 F. Supp.
953 (E.D. Mich. 1953); Navarro v. Landon, 106 F. Supp. 73 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
The honors go to Judge Picard, who ignored the conceptual distinctions 'the
Supreme Court had drawn and decided on the ground that ". . . to require, a
litigant to travel thousands of miles to prosecute a legal claim is not only unjitut
and highly inequitable but virtually a denial of the right to bring suit.", Ragni .v.
Butterfield, supra at 955. This is the ground on which the Supreme Court later
decided in Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, supra at .53."
34. 103 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1952), aff'd on other groinds, 343: U.S. 579
(1952).
35. Id. at 576.
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eminent attorneys, who are stationed throughout the land, defend the
suit whether or not the superior is joined, because the problem of joining the superior arises only when the real defendant is the government. (3) When government attorneys defend the suit because the
government is the real party in interest, a judgment or decree against
the subordinate must be res judicata against the government and
against other government officers, unless the same question is to be
litigated a second time between the real parties in interest.3 6 (4) When
government administration is decentralized, so that action is taken or
withheld by local officers, judicial review may appropriately be similarly decentralized.
The Supreme Court in 1955 has at last taken into account such
realities as these and has apparently departed completely from the
earlier conceptualism. In Pedreiro v. Shaughnessy, an alien sought
to challenge a deportation order in a suit against the district director
for an injunction and declaratory judgment. The Court held that the
Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization was not an indispensable party because "otherwise in order to try his case an alien
might be compelled to go to the District of Columbia to obtain jurisdiction over the Commissioner. To impose this burden on an alien
about to be deported would be completely inconsistent with the basic
policy of the Administrative Procedure Act to facilitate court review
of such administrative action. We know of no necessity for such a
harsh rule. Undoubtedly the Government's defense can be adequately
presented by the District Director who is under the supervision of
the Commissioner." 'T
This ground for decision is both entirely new and entirely sound.
It should become the foundation for future law.
The Court in the Pedreiro opinion gave only a partial and somewhat unsatisfactory answer to the question of res judicata. To the
argument that a judgment against the district director would not be
binding in other immigration districts, the Court said: "But we need
not decide the effect of such a judgment. We cannot assume that a
decision on the merits in a court of appeals on a question of this kind,
subject to review by this Court, would be lightly disregarded by the
immigration authorities." 38 This statement may be true as far as it
goes. But what if a judicial decision in the other district has held
the opposite, or what if the officer in the other district believes that the
court is wrong and would be reversed if the case were appealed? The
36. See the discussion at p. 79 infr.

37. 349 U.S. at 53.
38. Ibid.
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question of the binding effect of the court's decision may well arise.
Except for some remarks about habeas corpus;p the Court in the
Pedreiro opinion went no further into the problem of res judicata.
The Court could easily have examined its earlier decisions and
have found that even though the Court has failed to enunciate clear
and consistent law on the question whether a judgment in a suit
against an officer is res judicata against the government and hence
against other officers, yet the -authority that such a judgment is res
judicata is probably stronger than the opposing authority.'
The
Court could also easily have recognized that reason and policy are
strongly on the side of res judicata, for after a case has been litigated
between a private party and government attorneys who are representing the government's interest even though the nominal party is an
officer, the government should be. bound in the same way that any
other litigant would be bound, unless the unsatisfactory doctrine of
sovereign immunity is to be expanded into doubtful territory.
Now that the Pedreiro case has at last recognized that the requirement of joining superior officers should be governed by practicalities concerning geography and convenience, what is the law of the
future? Although the eight Supreme Court decisions are seriously
conflicting both in their holdings and in their grounds for decision,
and although such inconsistency is seldom eradicated by a single decision, yet the Pedreiro opinion makes such a significant advance over
the earlier decisions that one may hope and expect that it will become
the foundation for the further development of law.
The guiding principle probably should be: Whenever the government is administering a program through a local officer, the validity
of his action or refusal to act may be challenged in a suit against the
local officer without joining superior officers, whether or not a judgment or decree granting the relief sought will require action by superior
39. The Court said: "Nor is it to be assumed that a second effort to have the
same issue decided in a habeas corpus proceeding would do any serious harm to the
Government. In habeas corpus proceedings district courts would have the duty to
consider previous court decisions on the same matter. And even though in extraordinary circumstances new matters not previously adjudicated may arise in habeas
corpus proceedings, this is no adequate reason for subjecting an alien to the great
burden of having to go with his witnesses to the District of Columbia. . .
Ibid.
The particular problem of the Pedreiro case may be affected by the doctrine,
not here developed, that denial of a petition for habeas corpus is not res judicata
for purposes of a new petition for habeas corpus. United States ex rel. Accardi
v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 263 (1954); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230
(1924).
40. For discussion of the Supreme- Court's conflicting decisions on the question
whether judgments in suits against officers are res judicata against the government
when government counsel defend, see Davis, Sovereign Immunity in Suits Against
Officers for Relief Other Than Damages, 40 CoRN=. L.Q. 3, 30-35 (1954).

80

UNIVER'SITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVrEW

[Vol. "04'

officers. This principle is iri all respects consistent with-'the holdings.
in'the Williams, Toll, Grimes; and Pedreird cases, 4 ' and the reasons
for the principle are those stated in the Pedreiro opinion. The only
substantial reason against this principle is the notion that a challenge
of aft administrative policy is more appropriate in a suit against the
officer who has determined the policy than in a suit against a subordinate who has not made the determination but is merely carrying
it out; this notion is clearly rejected by the Williams, Toll, and Grimes
holdings, in each of which the enforcement of policies determined by
superior bfficers was enjoined even though the superior officers were
not before the court.'
The central principle sh6uld be implemented by several subsidiary
propositions: (1) The courts should consistently hold, as the Supreme
Court specifically held in the Williams and Grimes cases, that a decree
may be issued against a subordinate even though his compliance will
mean violation of instructions from his superiors or violation of formal
regulations issued by his superiors.4 (2) Such distinctions as those
between action and inaction, between injunctive and mandatory relief,
and between an act of a subordinate and an act of a superior through
a subordinate should no longer have any significance in determining
whether a superior must be joined."
(3) The idea of the Rutter
41. The proposed principle is not altogether consistent with the four cases that
have held the superior officer an indispensable party. Blackmar v. Guerre, 342
U.S. 512 (1952); Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507 (1925); Gnerich v. Rutter, 265
U.S. 388 (1924); Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 165 U.S. 28 (1897). The
Rutter and Webster cases are inconsistent with the later Williams, Toll, and Grimes
cases and therefore should be deemed already superseded. The Warner case may
be explained as meaning only that the Secretary is an indispensable party when the
relief sought is directly against the Secretary, not against-a subordinate. The Blackmar case is weak authority, because the question of relief against the regional
officer was disposed of with the cryptic remark that ".

.

. it is obvious that no

relief can be granted against him," whereas it should be "obvious" that relief can
be granted against an individual who has committed the wrongful act. The Blackmar
remark should not be followed.
42. In Williams, the local postmaster was enjoined from enforcing a fraud
order issued by or in the name of the Postmaster General. In Toll and in Grimes,
lotal officers were enjoined from enforcing regulations issued by their superiors
in Washington.
When a government -program requires uniformity of action, as did wartime
price control, the statute usually provides for centralization bf judicial review, as it,
did in that instance. 56 STAT. 31 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App. §924 (1952)., Cf.
Yakus v. United States, 321' U.S. 414 (1944)
43. See notes 18, 19, and 20 supra.
'44. The question may be asked: Hov' 'an a' court compel an affirmative act
by. a superior officer who is hot a party to the case? The main angwer to this
question lies in emphasizing that the proposed principle is 'limited to programs
which are administered by local officers; the decree will run only against the local
officer, just as in the Williams case the Court nullified the fraud order issued by the
Postmaster Gerieral' even though only the locdl postmaster was before the Court,
and just as in the Grimes and Toll cases, .the Court nullified regulations issued 'bynational officers even though only local officers were before the Court;Of all the cases mentioned in this 6ommeithry, not a sifigle onie' involves the
problem of whether a court outside the District of Columbia may order a superior
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case that a superior is indispensable -if
his hands will be tied and the
idea of the Webster case that a superior is indispensable if the power
and'responsibility are his have already been superseded by the holding
of the Williams case, where the Supreme Court approved a' decree
which 'tied the hands of the Postmaster General even though the power
and responsibility were the Postmaster General's. The two ideas of
the Rutter and Webster cases should not be revived.45 (4) A local
officer who has taken, is taking, or is threatening to take the challenged action should be deemed to have the authority to refrain from
or to undo the challenged action if the court holds the action to be
illegal and if the decree is otherwise fitting in the circumstances
(5) The Supreme Court should follow its own decisions holding that
a judgment or decree against a local officer in a case defended by government attorneys is res judicata against the government and against.
other government officers, whether the judgment or decree is coercive
or declaratory, and it should refuse to follow its holdings and dicta to
the contrary.47
officer in' Washington to perform an affirmative act, where a decree against the
subordinate would not suffice. Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 165 U.S. 28
(1897), does not qualify, for the suit was brought in the District of Columbia. If
the problem should arise, as it conceivably could, the ingenuity of an equity judge
could take care of it. A declaratory judgment could be granted even though the,
superior is not before the court and even though compliance with the declaratibn
would require the superior to take affirmative action. The court could also grant a
mandatory injunction ordering the subordinate to transmit the decision and the order
to the superior, and, depending on circumstances, the subordinate could be enjoined'
from further action against the-plaintiff until the superior officer has complied.In the exceedingly unusual- cAse in which a *uperior officer refuses to comply,
a suit against the superior could be brought in the District of Columbia. The decision against the subordinate would be res judicata. See note 40 supra.
45. The Secretary in the Webster .case had delegated authority to local disbursing officers to make payments of money. Even though the plaintiff sought a
mandatory decree, and even though the responsibility was the Secretary's, the decree
could be enforced against the local officers. If the program had not been administered
through the local officers, then a court might properly hold the Secretary to be
an indispensable party.
Lower federal courts have recently held in many cases, following Palmer v.
Walsh, 78 F. Supp. 64 (D. Ore. 1948), that federal courts outside the District of
Columbia cannot grant mandatory relief. But this line of cases is contrary to the
Supreme Court's practice in such cases as Virginian Ry.' v. System Federation'40,
RailWay" Employees Dep't, AFL; 300 U.S. 515 (1937), and Johnson v. *Yellow
Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383 (1944), contrary to 'the provision of § 10(b) of the
Administrative Procedure Act that relief from administrative action may include,
"mandatory injunction," .60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(b) (1952), and
contrary to the provision of § 10(e) (A) of the APA that the reviewing court "
shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully withheld, . . ." 60 STAT. 243 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (A) (1952). See Davis, Mandatory Relief from Adminstrative
ActiOn, 22 U., Crl. L. REv. 585 (1955).
46. This is to prevent an unfortunate result like that in Money v. Wallin, 186,
F2d 411 (3d Cir. 1951), in which the local officer' discharged the plaintiff, but, the
court held that the local officer had no delegated authority to reinstate the plaintiff.
Whatever strict logic may. require, practicaliiy requir'es tfat.an officer should be
deemed to have authority to correct the illegality of his action
47. See note 40 supra.
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The basic approach of the Pedreiro opinion should govern the law
of the future. Judicial thinking about this problem should revolve
around the practicalities of geography and convenience, not around
logical distinctions between inaction and affirmative action or between
4
acts of subordinates and acts of superiors through subordinates.
SUBSTITUTION OF OFFICERS' SUCCESSORS

"It all seems so foolish. Some day the rule will be amended." 4
These were the words of a perceptive district judge, who felt constrained by authority to apply the rule that an action against an officer
abates when the officer dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office
unless a timely substitution is made of his successor.
The Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure seems to
have the same insight as the district judge, for in its comment on
rule 25 (d), it has wisely observed that "the substitution of one nominal
party for another nominal party is a time-consuming formality." "'
Strangely enough, however, the Advisory Committee does not have
the courage of its convictions, for instead of proposing that the rule
be amended to dispense with what is admittedly a "time-consuming
formality," the Committee has recommended a retention of the requirement of timely substitution!
The purpose of this commentary is to demonstrate that the requirement of substitution of officers' successors is causing a good deal
of avoidable harm, and to propose that the requirement should be discontinued. The discussion will conclude with a specific proposal for
amending rule 25 (d).
The cornerstone of the present law is Snyder v. Buck." A widow
sued Buck, the Paymaster General of the Navy, for an allowance, and
the district court entered a judgment which concluded: ".

.

. and

the defendant is directed to pay the plaintiff Thirteen Hundred and
48. Of course, other solutions of the basic problem could be provided either by
statute or by amendment of rule 19 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
A little reflection on a practical plane will show how anachronistic and unnecessary is the idea of service of process upon government officers, as distinguished from

notice to the government's attorneys.
For an example of a statute which provides for suit against national officers in

the district court where the plaintiff resides or where the plaintiff corporation has
its principal place of business, see 40 STAT. 419 (1917), 50 U.S.C. App. § 9(a) (1952).
For commentary on the main problem, see Notes, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 238
L.J.
(1954), 54 CoLum. L. RFv. 1128 (1954), 23 IND. L.J. 305 (1948), 50 Y.
909 (1941), 50 H~Av. L. REv. 796 (1937), 4 U. Cnr. L. Rrv. 342 (1937).
49. Rosello v. Marshall, 12 F.R.D. 352, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (Liebell, J.).
50. PanTms
Y DRAFT o" PaoposEa AmEDmENTs To RuLEs op CivuL PaocEDUiRE FOR THE UNrn STATFS Drsmcr COURTS 20 (May 1954).

51. 340 U.S. 15 (1950).
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Sixty-five Dollars." After the judgment had been entered, Buck retired and was succeeded by Foster. Then government attorneys took
an appeal in the name of Buck, or, as the Supreme Court unrealistically
expressed it, ".

. the appeal was taken by Buck after his retirement

and therefore without authority." 52 Neither party substituted Foster's
name for Buck's within six months after Foster's succession. The
Supreme Court held that the action abated.
Even though the judgment in favor of the widow was valid when
it was entered, and even though the principal fault was that of the
government attorneys in taking the appeal in the name of Buck instead
of in the name of Foster, yet the Court held that "Petitioner [the
widow] loses her judgment and must start over." 5
If the governmentattorneys (or their stenographer) had only remembered that the name of Foster should have been substituted for
the name of Buck, the widow's judgment would not have become void
on account of Foster's succession to the office of Paymaster General.
But the government attorneys (or their stenographer) used the wrong
name. So the widow lost her judgment. The principle of justice
seems to be that when one party's attorneys (or their stenographer) are
at fault in failing to substitute the name of the successor officer, the
court should penalize the opposing party. 54
The holding rests upon interpretation of section 11 of the Judiciary
Act of 1925.," During the nineteenth century, it had been held that
an action aimed at compelling an official to discharge his official duties
abated when the official died or retired.
A statute of 1899 provided
that no such action should abate.5W But section 11 of the 1925 Act
provided that the court could permit such an action to be continued
against the successor "if within six months after his death or separation
from office it be satisfactorily shown to the court that there is a substantial need for so continuing. . .

."

1s The Court interpreted these

words to make survival of the action dependent upon timely substitution of the successor.
52. Id. at 20.

53. Id. at 22.
54. Either the government attorneys or the attorney for Mrs. Snyder could
have made timely motion to substitute Foster's name for Buck's. The primary responsibility was that of the government attorneys, for the simple reason that they
were the representatives of Buck and of Foster and of the government.
55, 43 STAT. 936, 941 (1925). See also FE. R. Civ. P. 25(d); U.S. Sup. CT.
RFv. RuuL 48(3).
56. E.g., Warner Valley Stock Co.-v. Smith, 165 U.S. 28 (1897).
57. 30 STAT. 822 (1899).
58. The 1925 act extended the 1899 act to apply to successors of state officers
as well as federal.
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Mr., Justice Frankfurter, joined-by Mr. Justice Jackson, argued-in
dissent that the 1925 legislation was intended to have the same effect as
the 1899 legislation, that the suit was in reality a suit against the United
States, that the suit could have been brought against the United States
in the Court of Claims, and that sovereign immunity should not stand
in the way when consent has been given to a suit in another forum:
"Accordingly, I would recognize that the judgment of the District
Court is in effect a money judgment against the United States and
would allow the Government's notice of appeal the force it 'was intended to have as an effective instrument whereby the United States
might obtain a review of that judgment. It would be nothing novel in
the observance of decorous form by courts to note as a matter of record
that the name of the Paymaster General of the Navy is now Fox
[Foster] and to proceed with the appeal on that basis." "
Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Mr. Justice Black, agreed with the majority that the appeal should fail but dissented from the-order vacating
the judgment of the district court.
The confusion of reality and pretense becomes especially interesting.
The reality is: the court's judgment was an order to pay government
money to the plaintiff. The pretense is: the defendant was Admiral
Buck, not the government. In the present stage of judicial making and
unmaking of the law of sovereign imnfunity, the law permits a court
to order a government officer to pay government money' to the plaintiff but forbids a court to order the government to 'pay government,
money to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, to win, must pretend that his
suit for government money is not against the government. The
court must indulge in the same-pretense.
The opinion in Snyder v. Buck is remarkable for the fluctuation
within the single case between pretense and reality. The holding rests
squarely on the pretense that the suit was not against the government,
even though nothing about the doctrine of sovereign immunity required
the Court to reject the reality on the question of substituting the name
of Foster for that of Buck.
Even though the holding rested upon the pretense, every one of
the three -opinions explicitly recognized the falsity of the pretense. -Mr.
Justice Douglas said for the majority: "Many actions against an official.
relating t6 the 'discharge of- his official duties' would in substance be
suits against the United States." 60' Mr. Justice Frankfurter spoke of
litigation brought formally against an official but ,intrinsically
59. 340 U.S. at 31.
60.A
Id t 20.'
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against the Government. ". .*" 61. And Mr. Justice Clark said"

-

it is clar that petitioner's claim, is against Buck in his representative
capacity, not personally." 2
Since the justices not only kniew, but even 'acknowledged, that the
judgment ordered a payment of the government'smoney and was only
in form against Buck, the Court could easily have written a simple
opinion that good sense requires that Buck's successor; Foster, 'or his
:assistants, ishould make the payment of government money to -the
widow.m
But instead of restricting the law of Snyder v. Buck, the Supteme
Court has recently expanded it. Unbelievable as it may seem, ari otherwise valid judgment can now be rendered void- by the succession of
one officer to another even though both parties make timely motionsto
substitute the successor's name. In McGratk v. National Association
of Manufacturers," the NAM sued McGrath, the Attorney General,
to enjoin prosecution for violation' of a statute. The three-judge .district court handed down an opinion on March 17, 1952, holding the
statute unconstitutional. McGrath resigned April 7, 1952. The judgment was entered against him May 2, 1952, to take effect March 17,
1952. McGranery succeeded to the office May 27, 1952. The government took the appeal to the Supreme Court in the name of -McGrath
"or, in the alternative, his successor in office, James P. McGranery, or,
in the further alternative, the United States." In a statement as to
jurisdiction, the Solicitor General explained the facts and said: "It is
respectfully requested and moved that the appeal be deemed taken -on
behalf of Mr. McGranery, the present Attorney General, and that the
latter be substituted as appellant in place of Mr. McGrath." On October 2, 1952, less than six months after the resignation- of McGrath,
the NAM filed a "Motion to Substitute James P. McGranery for J.
Howard McGrath."
Despite the timely motions made by parties on both sides to substitute one name for the other, the Supreme Court on October 13, 1952,
entered a per curiam order: "The judgment is vacated and the case
is remanded to the United States District Court with directions to
dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the case is moot." The
61. Id. at 22.
62. Id. at 32-33.
63. The statute the Court discussed in the opinion was susceptible of an interpretation that would produce a practical result. The law is what it is, not because
of Congress, but because of the' Supreme Court. As the Court observes in its
opinion in Snyder v. Buck (340 U.S. at 25), both the 1899 statute and the 1925
statute were enacted upon the recommendation of the judges.
64. 344 U.S. 804 (1952).
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Court cited Snyder v. Buck, but gave no additional reason. The Court
denied rehearing November 17, 1952, two justices dissenting. 5
The fortuitous fact that one officer succeeded another resulted in a
holding that a judgment in a suit which was in reality against the government was void, even though timely motion was made by both parties to substitute the successor.
The lower courts have generally felt obligated to follow Snyder v.
Buck and to apply the principle, not merely when an appeal is taken in
the name of an officer who has retired, but to apply it whenever during
litigation one officer is succeeded by another."' One court states the
typical attitude: "This is a harsh rule, but under the decisions of our
highest court the rule is mandatory and allows no discretion to the
district judge." 67
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has found an ingenious way out when the suit is only for a declaratory judgment. The
suit was for a declaration of citizenship under the Nationality Act of
1940 before that act was superseded. The parties had failed to make
timely substitution of Dulles for Acheson. The couAt comprehensively
reviewed the cases and found that the only reason for abatement was
the futility of issuing an order against one who cannot comply because
he is dead or out of office. But a declaration requires no one to do
anything. A declaration of citizenship is just as good against Acheson
as it is against Dulles, for it is "
to the defendant officer..
."s

. as binding to the world as it is
The opinion of the Ninth Circuit

was so persuasive that the Third Circuit reconsidered a decision abating
an action of the same sort and followed "the excellent opinion of the
Ninth Circuit." 9 One may hope that other courts will also follow the
Ninth Circuit.
But the ingenuity of the Ninth Circuit is unfortunately limited to
declaratory judgments and does not reach coercive judgments. A
change is still needed to reach coercive judgments.
The Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure has proposed amendment of rule 25(d) so that "a reasonable time" will be
substituted for the period of six months, and so that an officer sued
"inhis official capacity" may be described by his official title and not
65. 344 U.S. at 887.
66. Rosello v. Marshall, 12 F.R.D. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Joji v. Clark, 11
F.R.D. 253 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Schnoedewind v. Clark, 11 F.R.D. 107 (S.D.N.Y.
1950); Wisconsin v. Clark, 11 F.R.D. 103 (W.D. Wis. 1950).
67. Rosello v. Marshall, mspra note 49, at 354.
68. Acheson v. Furusho, 212 F.2d 284, 292 (9th Cir. 1954).
69. Lehmann v. Acheson, 214 F.2d 403, 404 (3d Cir. 1954); accord, Lew Thun
v. McGrath, 16 F.R.D. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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by nameY° The first proposal is faulty in that it wrongly assumes.the
need for substitution; substituting one nominal party for another serves
no useful purpose. The second proposal is shockingly unfortunate because it leads directly into a legal quagmire. Three kinds of suits may
be brought against officers: (1) suits against officers personally, and
in no sense against the government; (2) suits nominally against officers
personally, but in reality against the government; and (3) suits nominally against officers in their official capacity, but in reality against the
government. The distinction between the first and the other two is
almost always easy and clear; the rule might well be founded upon it.
The distinction between the second and the third is the legal quagmire;
to found the rule upon it is an invitation to fruitless litigation.
In the leading case of United States v. Lee,"' which was a suit for
land claimed by the government, the Court said that the case was
i
. against Strong and Kaufman, as individuals, to recover possession..
.,"
72
In another leading case, Ex parte Young,73 the
theory was that when an officer acts without valid authority he is
" . stripped of his official or representative character and is sub4
jected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct." 7
The theory of the case was that the capacity of the officer was personal or individual, not official. Probably the usual formulation in
more recent times is that of Georgia R. R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine: 75 "This Court has long held that a suit to restrain unconstitutional action threatened by an individual who is a state officer is not a
suit against the State. . . . This general rule has been applied in
suits against individuals threatening to enforce allegedly unconstituWe hold that this action against appellee as.an
tional taxation. . .
individual is -notbarred-as an unconsented suit against the State." 76
But in other opinions, for no apparent reason, the Supreme Court
has assumed that the suits are against officers as officers or in their
official capacity, and not against the officers as individuals or in their
personal capacity. In Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby,77 the
Court seemingly went out of its way in granting mandamus against
an officer to say that the order was against the defendant ". . . in
-

70. PRELIMINTARY DRAFr OF PROPOsED AMENDMENTS To RULES OF CIVIL
CEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRCT COURTS 18 (May 1954).

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

106 U.S. 196 (1882).
Id. at 210.
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Id. at 160.
342 U.S. 299 (1952).
Id. at 304-05.
211 U.S. 249 (1908).
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.,8
In the, key case :of -this commentary,
his official capacity..
against
Snyder v. Buck, the Court said that the judgment.was ".. .
respondent in his official capacity as Paymaster General of.the Navy." "
In the important recent case of -Larslonv. Foreign & Domestic.:Commerce Corp.,8 the'Court said that the .uit was against the officer
: because of his official function as. chief of the War Assets
Administration. It asked for an injunction, against him.,in that
, 81
capacity.
.
None of these various opinions attempts an explanation of why
.suits which are in reality against the government are sometimes assumed
to be against the officers as individuals and why they are someti.pes assumed to be against the officers as officers. Probably most of the remarks just..quoted were uttered withQut any special consideration of
this question. But a plaintiff in 1944 lost his case in the Supreme
Court because he sued 'the officer "officially" instead of "personally."
The Court said that the suit "was against the official, not the individual," and implied that if. it had been against the individual, not the
official, the case might have been considered on the merits. 2 The de'cision has been followed by two later Supreme Court cases.'
A rule 'cannot be satisfactory which is based upon a distinction
between (1) suits which. are in reality against the government but
-nominally against an officer, as an officer or in his official capacity,
and (2) suits which are in reality against the government but nominally
against an officer as an individual or in his personal capacity."
A workable rule should rest upon a distinction which is almost
always clear and. easy-the distinction between a suit which is in reality
-against the government and a suit which is not in reality against the
government. An amendment of rule 25(d) should be based upon
this distinction.
True, to acknowledge in a formal rule that a suit is "in reality"
against the government is to contribute to the erosion of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. But that is a virtue. As long as the doctrine
of sovereign immunity is retained, lawmakers should lose no oppor78. Id. at 255.
79. 340 U.S. at 15-16.
80. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
81. Id. at 686.
82. Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944).
83. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 327 U.S. 573 (1946);
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
84. No difference is discernable between a suit against an officer as an officer
and a suit against an officer in his official capacity. Apparently neither expression
will apply to cases like Lee, Young and Redwine, if the 'terminology of those
opinions is to be believed.
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tunity to weaken or restrict it. Frank acknowledgment in a formal
rule that a suit may be "in reality" against the government will go no
further than to bring the rule abreast of what each of the three opinions
in the Snyder case has already frankly acknowledged."5 Furthermore,
the proposal that the rule be framed in terms of suits which are "in
reality" against the government does not cut into the tradition of
sovereign immunity to any greater extent than the Advisory Committee's proposal to permit suits against officers who are described
only by their official titles."8
The paramount objective of a rule which is sensible and workable
should be to get rid of the "time-consuming formality" of substituting
one nominal party for another nominal party.
Accordingly, the main provision of rule 25 (d) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure should be amended so that the substance will be along the
following line:
When an action is by or against a public officer in name but is .by
or against the government in reality, the substitution of one nominal party for another nominal party is not required. Any judgment or decree for or against an officer in such a case shall describe
him by his official title and shall be enforceable by or against the
incumbent of the office at the time of enforcement.
85. See notes 60, 61 and 62 supra.
86. When the government is the real defendant, a judgment or decree against
Acheson is binding upon Dulles, upon Dulles' successors, upon Dulles' subordinates,
and upon the government, according to the stronger authority. The authorities on
this question of res judicata are discussed in Davis, Sovereign Immunity in Suits
Against Officers for Relief Other Than Damages, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 3, 30-35 (1954).
The only reasons that can be given for substituting the name of Dulles for the
name of Acheson are (1) so that the order will be enforceable against Dulles, and
(2) so that the order will not be enforceable against Acheson. But both reasons
are automatically satisfied without the substitution. Whenever the government is
the real defendant, an order against Acheson is enforceable against Dulles. And
whenever the government is the real defendant, an order will be enforced against
the incumbent officer, not against the former officer.
As is fully shown in the article just cited, Supreme Court cases on sovereign
immunity in suits against officers are so diverse that almost any formal rule is
likely to cut into one or more individual decisions. The rule here proposed will
probably change the result in the very extreme decision of Ex parte La Prade, 289
U.S. 444 (1933), where the Court held that a threat of enforcement by an attorney
general whose term of office then expired was not enough to make the challenge
of the statute ripe for consideration, even if the successor attorney general were
substituted. If the proposed rule weakens the law of the La Prade case, so much
the better. The Advisory Committee's proposal to describe the officer by official
title instead of by name would to the same extent weaken the law of the La Prade
case.

